Röthig goes on to describe what appeared to be a scrupulous and complicated investment strategy but was actually a mindless, rule-based investment strategy. IKB could “price a C.D.O. to the last basis point,” as one admiring observer told Risk in 2004. But this expertise was a kind of madness. “They would be really anal about, say, which subprime originator went into these C.D.O.’s,” says Nicholas Dunbar. “But it didn’t matter. They were arguing about bonds that would collapse from 100 down to 2 or 3. In a sense they were right: they bought the bonds that went to 3, rather than to 2.” As long as the bonds offered up by the Wall Street firms abided by the rules specified by IKB’s experts, they got hoovered into the Rhineland Funding portfolio without further inspection. Yet the bonds were becoming radically more risky because the loans that underpinned them were becoming crazier and crazier. It’s The Economy, Dummkopf!” by Michael Lewis in Vanity Fair
If you look at the price earnings ratio for technology companies relative to the price earnings ratios for all industrial companies, you take that ratio, PE technology divided by PE industrial, you can plot that ratio over the last 40 years, and it is at the lowest point that it’s ever been. Another priceless quote from this interview with Larry Summers
LinkedIn, Zynga, Facebook, Groupon, Twitter, etc. — are already public, just not public on traditional stock exchanges… So, when they go re-public, that is, when they go public on more traditional exchanges, like Nasdaq or the NYSE, that will be the moment at which insiders exit en masse in an unprecedented way. Any professional investor who wanted a taste of this stuff has it, and they will be idiots not to exit when the liquidity improves on more traditional exchanges. Dear Warren: Here are the Overvalued Social Networking Companies - Bloomberg (via jryu)
Cite Arrow reblogged from mikehudack
Absolutely love this New York Times ‘budget puzzle’ that lets you cut things from the U.S. federal budget and what impact it would have on the deficit.
Shows how incredibly tough it will be to get the U.S. federal government’s finances back in order.Hard to imagine anyone in Congress will have the political capital or willpower to do it until things get bad.Really bad.

Absolutely love this New York Times ‘budget puzzle’ that lets you cut things from the U.S. federal budget and what impact it would have on the deficit.

Shows how incredibly tough it will be to get the U.S. federal government’s finances back in order.
Hard to imagine anyone in Congress will have the political capital or willpower to do it until things get bad.
Really bad.

For retail [investors] to survive in this emerging environment, I think they will have to be long-term passive investors who are basically index players because any market inefficiencies will be small, transient and exploited by those with huge economies of scale. The notion that a single retail investor can somehow bet the market in a short-time play by exploiting an arbitrage now seems impossible. Martin Fahy, CEO of the Financial Services Institute of Australiasia, in ‘Lost in the dark pools of competition’, Weekend AFR, July 3-4, 2010

newyorker:

NEW VIDEO: Nassim Nicholas Taleb talks with James Surowiecki about the causes of the 2008 financial crisis and the future of the economy.

Read James Surowiecki’s piece from this week’s issue on the regulation crisis.

Cite Arrow reblogged from newyorker

The social effects of the SEC’s action will almost certainly be greater than the narrow legal ones. Just as there was a time when people could smoke on airplanes, or drive drunk without guilt, there was a time when a Wall Street bond trader could work with a short seller to create a bond to fail, trick and bribe the ratings companies into blessing the bond, then sell the bond to a slow-witted German without having to worry if anyone would ever know, or care, what he’d just done.

That just changed.

Bond Market Will Never Be the Same After Goldman’, Michael Lewis in Bloomberg
The bottom line is that no amount of disclosure would change that the very sophisticated investors already knew that some entity or entities by necessity had to take a short position, and that any and all participants – including themselves – might express their views as to the reference portfolio… Regardless of who selected them, the offering documents for each of the reference securities disclosed detailed information on their underlying assets, as required by Regulation AB. It is this concrete information on the assets – not the economic interest of the entity that selected them – that investors could analyze and use to inform their decisions. I agree with Goldman Sachs’ defense to the SEC’s claim. The quote above argues it particularly well.
A 2006 survey of almost three hundred hedge-fund professionals found they on average had spent $376,000 on jewelry, $271,000 on watches, and $124,000 on “traditional” spa services over the previous twelve months. The Greatest Trade Ever by Gregory Zuckerman. $271,000 on watches. Really?

From [the moment Salomon Brothers went public], though, the Wall Street firm became a black box. The shareholders who financed the risks had no real understanding of what the risk takers were doing, and as the risk-taking grew ever more complex, their understanding diminished. The moment Salomon Brothers demonstrated the potential gains to be had by the investment bank as public corporation, the psychological foundations of Wall Street shifted from trust to blind faith.

No investment bank owned by its employees would have levered itself 35 to 1 or bought and held $50 billion in mezzanine C.D.O.’s. I doubt any partnership would have sought to game the rating agencies or leap into bed with loan sharks or even allow mezzanine C.D.O.’s to be sold to its customers. The hoped-for short-term gain would not have justified the long-term hit.

The End of Wall Street’s Boom’ by Michael Lewis for Portfolio
[Hedge fund manager Steve Eisman] couldn’t figure out exactly how the rating agencies justified turning BBB loans into AAA-rated bonds. “I didn’t understand how they were turning all this garbage into gold,” he says. He brought some of the bond people from Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and UBS over for a visit. “We always asked the same question,” says Eisman. “Where are the rating agencies in all of this? And I’d always get the same reaction. It was a smirk.” He called Standard & Poor’s and asked what would happen to default rates if real estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldn’t say; its model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number. “They were just assuming home prices would keep going up,” Eisman says. The End of Wall Street’s Boom’ by Michael Lewis for Portfolio

I spoke to another hedge fund in London so perplexed by the many bad LBOs Icelandic banks were financing that it hired private investigators to figure out what was going on in the Icelandic financial system. The investigators produced a chart detailing a byzantine web of interlinked entities that boiled down to this: A handful of guys in Iceland, who had no experience of finance, were taking out tens of billions of dollars in short-term loans from abroad. They were then re-lending this money to themselves and their friends to buy assets—the banks, soccer teams, etc. Since the entire world’s assets were rising—thanks in part to people like these Icelandic lunatics paying crazy prices for them—they appeared to be making money.

Yet another hedge-fund manager explained Icelandic banking to me this way: You have a dog, and I have a cat. We agree that they are each worth a billion dollars. You sell me the dog for a billion, and I sell you the cat for a billion. Now we are no longer pet owners, but Icelandic banks, with a billion dollars in new assets. “They created fake capital by trading assets amongst themselves at inflated values,” says a London hedge-fund manager. “This was how the banks and investment companies grew and grew. But they were lightweights in the international markets.”

Wall Street on the Tundra’ - Michael Lewis’s excellent Vanity Fair article on Iceland’s economic collapse

Morgan Stanley CEO John Mack describes how he navigated the firm through the depths of the financial crisis last year. He comes across as quite an amazing guy.

I found watching him give this talk quite chilling - a stark reminder of how close we came to the brink of a 1930s style great depression in September 2008. When Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 on September 15th Morgan Stanley were sitting on $181 billion in cash, but at the same time they knew they were a week or two away from bankruptcy. $181 billion is a shitload of cash even for a Wall St investment bank.

At the same time, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein was calling Mack saying “You’ve got to hold on because if you go we’re 30 seconds behind you”. Anyone at all familiar with Wall St will understand the implications of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley filing for bankruptcy. That would certainly have been the beginning of an incredibly unpleasant time for the entire developed world.

A bank is supposed to raise money and lend it to sectors that need it. It’s not supposed to be a hedge fund. That’s a different beast. If you want to set up a hedge fund, that’s wonderful but I have no societal interest in subsidising it.

- Elliot Spitzer

FT.com / Columnists / Lunch with the FT - Lunch with the FT: Eliot Spitzer (via heyitsnoah)

Cite Arrow reblogged from heyitsnoah