Dear America: you can’t have an economy based on narcissism, good intentions, marketing, catering to rich bored people, really excellent webpages, and selling underpants on the internet. I’m afraid you’ll have to make something of value… I may as well prepare my emigration papers to Singapore, stat. Perhaps I can get a job for their Sovereign Wealth Fund. My job would be simple: buy stocks in nations which make stuff using paper money you get from nations whose main exports are Ivy League educated swindlers trying to sell baloney as a service. Scott Locklin: “In which I stomp on some of our glorious “green shoots” (brilliant and insightful as always)
To facilitate Blankfein’s call for transparency, we’re launching the Goldman Project, an ongoing attempt to track and publicize the multi-million second homes, $50,000 cars, $500 bottles of wine, and ostentatious living that we are subsidizing. And we need your help: Are you Facebook friends with a Goldmanite who just posted photos of his lavish bachelor party? Post them to our fancy new tag page, #GoldmanProject, or e-mail them to us. Are you a realtor who just sold a $4 million duplex a Goldman banker? Is your ex-boyfriend Goldman banker planning a year-end trip to Cabo to blow his bonus wad? Shoot us an e-mail. Likewise, if you catch any references to Goldman employees living large in the media, post them to #GoldmanProject to keep a running clipfile.

Gawker sets the stage for “Internets vs Goldman Sachs” Round 1, starting with an initiative to crowdsource the collection of personal excesses by GS employees.

I agree with FT Alphaville’s take on this - just because these guys make and spend a lot of money doesn’t mean they forfeit their right to privacy. Goldman has paid back its TARP funds, which it probably didn’t want in the first place. Perhaps they should have been (and should be) regulated more heavily, but that’s not a reason to hold a witchhunt against everyday employees buying their first apartment.

Unfortunately it’s screw the shareholders!!” Charles K. Gifford wrote to a fellow [Bank of America] director in an e-mail exchange that took place during the call. “No trail,” Thomas May, that director, reminded him, an apparent reference to the inadvisability of leaving an e-mail thread of their conversation. Bank of America E-Mail Shows Concerns Over Merrill Deal”, New York Times
I found this quite fascinating. The VIX is the market expression of expected S&P 500 volatility. Look what happened in 2008! We are now closing in on the 20 year average which suggests a return to some kind of normality.
(from famed Morgan Stanley analyst Mary Meeker’s latest ‘Economy & Internet Trends’ report)

I found this quite fascinating. The VIX is the market expression of expected S&P 500 volatility. Look what happened in 2008! We are now closing in on the 20 year average which suggests a return to some kind of normality.

(from famed Morgan Stanley analyst Mary Meeker’s latest ‘Economy & Internet Trends’ report)

Interesting combination of news headline and banner ad.

Interesting combination of news headline and banner ad.

To model correctly one tranche of one CDO took about three hours on one of the fastest computers in the United States. There is no chance that pretty much anybody understood what they were doing with these securities. Creating things that you don’t understand is really not a good idea no matter who owns it.

Former Merrill Lynch CEO John Thain admits that he really had no idea what the CDOs on their balance sheet were worth. Felix Salmon quite rightly blasts him for changing his story, having previously claimed that he knew exactly what the positions were worth. If I were a Merrill shareholder I’d expect my $80million/year CEO to have a decent understanding of what’s going on.

This isn’t a new revelation. Michael Lewis’s 1989 novel Liar’s Poker pointed out that Salamon Brothers Chairman John Gutfreund didn’t understand the risks his firm was taking. The securities they were dealing with were way simpler back then - I don’t think we should be surprised that today’s top Wall St executives have totally lost touch with the details of their complex derivative portfolios.

I’m with Warren Buffett - every CEO of an investment company should also play the role of their firm’s Chief Risk Officer, taking responsibility for understanding and managing the risks in their portfolio. I think things would be quite different if CEOs didn’t delegate this responsibility.

Fascinating chart showing how housing prices have moved over time in various countries, via McKinsey Quarterly.

Fascinating chart showing how housing prices have moved over time in various countries, via McKinsey Quarterly.

The need for traditional investment banking services—intermediating capital flows and financial transactions for all comers—is not going to go away any time soon. It is simply impractical to imagine a world without investment bankers, no matter how eagerly the torch and pitchfork crowd would love to do so. But it seems to be a somewhat paradoxical business, one best suited to entities which combine extremely aggressive pursuit of revenues with a highly developed aversion to risk.

The Epicurean Dealmaker is by far my favourite finance blog. This quote is from Part IV of his series of posts on investment banking compensation. Part I, Part II, Part III.

Anyone who has even the slightest interest in understanding the role of compensation in the recent financial crisis should read all four posts.

I’ve just watched the trailer for Michael Moore’s new film, “Capitalism: A love story”. It kind of pissed me off, but I wasn’t going to comment on it… until I came across this amazing post on Dealscape about the film’s New York premiere:

Before the film, the crowd sipped champagne and cocktails in the “Morgan Stanley Lobby” and then headed to their seats in the “Citi Balcony.” Movie tickets were available at the “Bank of New York Box Office” and there’s outdoor seating at the “Credit Suisse Information Grandstand.”

Hypocrisy at all? The premiere was followed by a rather swish event at one of New York’s trendiest and most expensive bars. I guess Moore isn’t all that much opposed to capitalism.

Judging from the trailer, the movie is much more interested in scoring cheap points out of an emotionally charged situation than actually evaluating what went wrong and how to fix it. In the trailer he chases down traders in expensive suits asking:

“Can you tell me what a credit default swap is? Can you explain a derivative to me?”

I can’t help thinking, “Maybe if you weren’t such a simplistic, ignorant, illiterate, manipulative, fat-ass then you’d be able to read and understand the Wikipedia articles on these basic financial instruments”. See credit default swap, derivative.

For those who can’t be bothered: a credit default swap is a contract you can buy from that pays you a certain amount of money if a specified bond defaults (fails to pay). A derivative is a contract that derives it value from the value of a traditional financial asset (e.g. a stock or a bond). It’s not that complicated.

Moore’s film makes me so angry because he is trivialising such an important subject. After Lehman collapsed in September last year, we came unbelievably close to global disaster on a scale that is very difficult for us to imagine. I remember saying to people that the only thing standing between Western civilisation and a 1930s style Great Depression was the IMF - a scary situation indeed.

It appears that we have successfully purchased our escape from the brink. At what ultimate cost I don’t know. We need to learn some tough lessons from the events of the past two years, and we need to learn them fast. I just don’t think Moore’s sensationalist, crude exploration of the subject is going to help at all. This is a shame - because if he did this right then he could really make a difference.

If I had to pick one decision which played the pivotal role in the financial crisis, it would have to be the SEC’s agreement to waive leverage limits at the biggest investment banks in 2004. From traditional levels in the low teens, leverage ratios at banks like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns skyrocketed to the mid thirties and higher. I don’t care how good a risk manager you are, if you only have three dollars in equity supporting $100 in assets, the merest market move or collapse in trading liquidity can kill you. If you fail with a balance sheet of $10 or $20 billion, a bunch of shareholders, employees, and counterparties will wipe away a tear and mourn your passing. If you’re holding half a trillion to a trillion dollars, however, the collateral damage from your ruin will have everybody licking their wounds—and writing outraged letters to the Times—for years, if not decades. From this fantastic blog post by the Epicurean Dealmaker.
Today we still have the same amount of debt, but it belongs to governments. Normally debt would get destroyed and turn to air. Debt is a mistake between lender and borrower, and both should suffer. But the government is socializing all these losses by transforming them into liabilities for your children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren. What is the effect? The doctor has shown up and relieved the patient’s symptoms – and transformed the tumour into a metastatic tumour. We still have the same disease. We still have too much debt, too many big banks, too much state sponsorship of risk-taking. And now we have six million more Americans who are unemployed – a lot more than that if you count hidden unemployment. Nassim Taleb, “We still have the same disease
Trading in Lehman Brothers stock continues apace, with the opportunistic and insane swapping of over 68 million shares on Monday in preperation for Tuesday’s one year anniversary. The inmates are running the asylum (via FT Alphaville)

Most people don’t think of themselves as gamblers; they prefer to think of themselves as people who make deliberate and rational choices in a deterministic world. Modern society is set up to give us all the illusion that we can be protected from all risk. Tort law in America is set up with the assumption that everything works in a Cartesian fashion, for example. There is very little allowance for randomness and fate: someone or something is always held responsible for bad things.

People misunderstand the role of risk and randomness in their professional lives. Most people, for example, get jobs. A job seems like a relatively risk-free lifestyle. Jobs certainly remove virtually all upside potential, so you’d expect to be compensated with lower volatility. I think a lot of people are now finding out they mis-calibrated their job volatility risk.

From this fascinating post by Scott Locklin.